On the Establishment Dynamics in the United States and Japan by Toshihiko Mukoyama
 

















INSTITUTE FOR MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES 
 
BANK OF JAPAN 
 
2-1-1 NIHONBASHI-HONGOKUCHO 
CHUO-KU, TOKYO 103-8660 
 JAPAN 
 
You can download this and other papers at the IMES Web site: 
http://www.imes.boj.or.jp 
 

























NOTE:  IMES Discussion Paper Series is circulated in 
order  to  stimulate  discussion  and  comments.  Views 
expressed in Discussion Paper Series are those of 
authors and do not necessarily reflect those of 
the Bank of Japan or the Institute for Monetary 
and Economic Studies.   IMES Discussion Paper Series 2009-E-16 
July 2009 
 





This paper compares the establishment-level dynamics of the United States and 
Japan.  I find that there are substantial differences in entry and exit behavior, the 
average size of establishments, and the amount of job reallocation.  First, entry 
and exit rates are much lower in Japan.  Second, the average size of 
establishments is much smaller in Japan, while the average size of opening/closing 
establishments are similar in the U.S. and Japan.  Third, the amount of job 
creation and job destruction is much smaller in Japan, especially for continuing 
establishments.  I first examine whether these differences are accounted for by 
sectoral compositions, and find that the differences in sectoral composition do not 
explain these facts.  Then I construct a general equilibrium industry dynamics 
model and explore the roles of various frictions in generating these differences. 
The model experiments suggest that in Japan, there may be important impediments 
for establishment entry/exit and there may be factors impeding productive 
establishments from growing larger. 
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An economy evolves over time through reallocations. New goods are created, old
goods disappear, ¯rms and establishments enter and exit, and workers switch jobs and
occupations. In recent years, economists have started to learn that the amount of
reallocation is massive and reallocation has important consequences on aggregate pro-
ductivity. For example, Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001) decompose the sources
of multifactor productivity growth in U.S. manufacturing into three factors: productiv-
ity gain within each plant, change in output shares across plants, and entry/exit. They
¯nd that the contribution of the latter two, which is the productivity growth coming
from reallocation, accounts for more than half of total productivity growth|the second
accounts for 34% and the third accounts for 24% of total productivity growth.
This paper focuses on the reallocation process at the establishment level. In par-
ticular, I highlight the di®erences in the establishment-level dynamics between the
U.S. and Japan. I ¯rst present some summary statistics from the establishment-level
data in both countries. It turns out that the establishment-level dynamics are very
di®erent in many aspects. In particular, the turnover of establishments is much more
frequent in the U.S. than in Japan. The amount of the job reallocations is much lower
in Japan. Additionally, the average size of all establishments is smaller in Japan, while
the average sizes of opening and closing establishments are similar in the U.S. and
Japan.
Next, I make an attempt to explain these di®erences. One possibility is that these
di®erences are due to the disparity in the composition of sectors. For example, in the
manufacturing sector, the establishment (plant) size tends to be larger than in the
other sectors. The di®erence in the average size of the establishment can be due to
the di®erence in the share of the manufacturing sector in each country. It turns out
that the di®erence in the sectoral composition is not a main source of the U.S.-Japan
disparity in the establishment sizes and entry/exit rates.
Since the di®erence is not due to sectoral composition, it has to be the case that the
establishment behavior in each sector is di®erent in the U.S. and Japan. What, then,
1would account for the di®erence in the behavior? Here, I utilize a general equilibrium
industry dynamics model, based on Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), to investigate
the possible institutional elements that account for these di®erences.
The strategy taken here is to consider the U.S. economy to be the benchmark,
and examine what kind of \frictions" can account for the establishment dynamics
in Japan. I consider several possible frictions. The ¯rst is a lower value received
by the establishment upon exiting. If, for example, the secondary market for the
capital stock is less developed, the exiting establishment cannot bene¯t from the sale
of used capital. The second is a higher entry cost. Using a similar model and cross-
country data, Moscoso Boedo and Mukoyama (2008) argue that entry regulation can
have a substantial impact on output and productivity. The third is a high labor
adjustment cost. A large hiring cost and ¯ring cost may reduce the reallocation of
labor across establishments. The fourth is the tax on size. When there are restrictions
on establishment size, it has a direct e®ect on establishment dynamics.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the characteristics of the
establishment-level dynamics in the U.S. and Japan are summarized. In Section 3, I
examine whether the di®erences in the establishment dynamics in these two countries
can be accounted for by the di®erences in sectoral composition. In Section 4, I build
a general equilibrium industry dynamics model to explore the possible institutional
di®erences that can account for the disparity. Section 5 concludes.
2 Establishment dynamics in the U.S. and Japan
Table 1 describes the establishment size distributions in the U.S. and Japan. The U.S.
data is from Statistics of U.S. Businesses (SUSB) dataset.1 The table is calculated
from the 2003{2004 data. The Japanese data is taken from the Establishment and En-
terprise Census (EEC) 2006.2 From the table, it can clearly be seen that the Japanese
1See http://www.census.gov/csd/susb/ for more details of this dataset. This table is created
as a customized table. The SUSB dataset is also used by Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007).
2See http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/jigyou/2006/zenkoku/index.htm for the details
of the data. The table is created from their Table 11. It is always di±cult to compare micro-level
2U.S. (%) Japan (%)
1 ¡ 4 48.52 60.94
5 ¡ 9 21.52 19.16
10 ¡ 19 14.24 10.89
20 ¡ 49 9.77 6.30
50 ¡ 99 3.32 1.63
100 ¡ 499 2.35 0.91
500 ¡ 999 0.17 0.06
1000¡ 0.10 0.02
Table 1: The size distribution of establishments in the U.S. and Japan
U.S. Japan
Entry rate (annual, %) 11.6 4.4
Exit rate (annual, %) 10.2 4.4
Table 2: Entry and exit rates
establishments tend to be smaller.3
Table 2 documents the entry rates and the exit rates of the establishments in the
U.S. and Japan. The U.S. data is taken from the SUSB dataset (2003-2004),4 and
business datasets across countries, but the SUSB dataset and the EEC datasets are reasonably compa-
rable since both are Census-based datasets that cover all the establishments in most of the industries.
The basic data of the SUSB is from the Business Register and it is augmented by the information
in the Company Organization Survey, the Annual Survey of Manufactures, and Current Business
Surveys, as well as from administrative records of the Internal Revenue Service, the Social Security
Administration, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The EEC data is based on the questionnaires that
are collected by the enumerators sent from the municipal supervisors or directly by the governments.
3Di®erent datasets, such as the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) dataset
document somewhat smaller sizes for the U.S. establishments. However, the same tendency holds for
the QCEW datasets|QCEW establishments are still larger than Japanese establishments.
4Pinkston and Spletzer (2004) estimate somewhat larger numbers based on the Business Employ-
ment Dynamics dataset|the entry rate is 13.0% annually and the exit rate is 12.0% on average for
1998-2002 (their Table 4). The SUSB dataset provides similar numbers as Table 2 during 1995-2003
except for 1996-1997 and 2001-2002 data (during these years, except for 1996-1997 and 2001-2002,
entry rates range 11.3% to 11.9% and exit rates range from 10.3% to 10.8%). In 1996-1997, the entry
rate was 13.8% and the exit rate was 11.3%; in 1996-1997, the entry rate was 12.4% and the exit
rate was 11.8%. Both rates are higher than the other years and closer to the numbers reported by
Pinkston and Spletzer. This may be due to the fact that 1997 and 2002 are both Census years. I
3U.S. Japan
JC by expanding establishments (annual, %) 10.3 4.2
JC by opening establishments (annual, %) 5.5 4.5
JD by contracting establishments (annual, %) 9.2 3.9
JD by closing establishments (annual, %) 5.2 3.7
Table 3: Job creation and job destruction statistics
the Japanese data is taken from the White Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises
in Japan 2007 (Japan Small Business Research Institute, 2007),5 Fig 1-2-4. They are
dramatically di®erent|the U.S. establishments experience much more turnover than
the Japanese establishments.6
Table 3 compares the job creation rate (JC) and job destruction rate (JD) in the
U.S. and Japan. JC by continuing establishments and opening establishments are
calculated separately. Similarly, JD by continuing establishments and closing estab-









where nit is the employment of the establishment i at time t. In words, this is the
sum of employment gains in expanding establishments, divided by the total number of
thank Yoonsoo Lee for pointing this out.
5See http://www.chusho.meti.go.jp/pamflet/hakusyo/h19/download/2007hakusho eng.pdf
for the details. There, other methods for counting the numbers of establishments are also explored.
Although the other methods deliver the entry/exit rates in di®erent frequencies, the annual average
seems to accord with the numbers documented in Table 2.
6The entry rate can also be calculated from EEC 2006 (Figure 16)|one can divide the number
of establishments created in 2005 by the total number of establishments. This delivers 2.9%. Note
that the EEC table indicates that there are less entry during 2005 compared to an average year.
For example, there are more establishments that entered during 2004 and survived until 2006 survey
compared to the ones that entered during 2005.
4U.S. Japan
Average size of all establishments 17.6 9.4
Average size of opening establishments 8.3 9.6
Average size of closing establishments 9.0 7.9
Table 4: Establishments in the U.S. and Japan: average sizes









This is the sum of the employment loss in shrinking establishments divided by the total
number of employment. The value of nit is zero for a closing establishment. Here, the
U.S. data is taken from the SUSB.7 The Japanese values are from Genda (1998)8 for
the period 1991-1994.9 Both JC and JD are smaller for Japanese establishments. In
particular, JC and JD by continuing establishments are much smaller in Japan than in
the U.S. JC by opening establishments and JD by closing establishments in the U.S.
and Japan are comparable.
Table 4 calculates the average sizes of all establishments, opening establishments,
and closing establishments. The U.S. sizes are calculated from the SUSB (2003-2004).10
The Japanese total average is calculated from EEC 2006. Since I do not have annual
data that can directly calculate the average sizes for opening and closing establishments
7Pinkston and Spletzer (2004) also estimate the job creation and job destruction rates. For the
average of 1998-2002, their numbers are 8.2, 5.2, 8.8, and 4.9 in the order of Table 3.
8JC can also be calculated by opening establishments from EEC 2006 (Figure 16)|one can divide
\employment by establishments created in 2005" by \total employment." This delivers 2.7%. Note
that (as in footnote 6) the EEC table indicates that there are less entry during 2005 compared to an
average year.
9Genda (2004) conducts a similar calculation (only for continuing establishments) for 1995-2000
and obtains similar numbers. Ohta, Genda, and Teruyama (2008) updates the total JC and JD until
2004. There is some increase in the total JD from late 1990s to early 2000s, but the maximum is 5.5%
in 2001, so it is still small compared to the U.S. total number.
10In the Business Employment Dynamics data, created from QCEW (2000-2007), the average size
of opening establishments is 4.6 and the average size of closing establishments is 4.6. The average size
of all establishments is 13.6.
5in Japan,11 I use the following procedure to calculate them indirectly.12 First, note
that from (1) with ni;t¡1 = 0, JC by entrants (JCe

























t is the number of entrants at time t and Nt is the total number of establish-



















£ [Average size of all establishments]:
The average size of closing establishments can be calculated similarly, using an equation
derived from (2). The result, shown in Table 4, reveals that the average sizes of all
establishments are very di®erent in the U.S. and Japan, while the average sizes of the
opening and closing establishments are similar.
Summarizing, there are three main di®erences in the establishment dynamics, com-
paring the U.S. and Japan.
1. (Entry/exit fact): Entry and exit rates are lower in Japan.
2. (JC/JD fact): Job creation and job destruction rates for existing establishments
are much lower in Japan, while job creation by opening establishments and job
destruction by closing establishments are relatively similar across these countries.
3. (Size fact): The average size of all establishments is much smaller in Japan, while
the average sizes of opening and closing establishments are similar across these
countries.
In the following two sections, I attempt to account for these di®erences.
11For opening establishments, the average size can be calculated from EEC 2006 (Figure 16). This
delivers the average size of 8.9.
12I can, in principle, apply this method to the U.S. data as well. This results in 7.9 for opening
establishments and 8.5 for closing establishments.
63 Does sectoral composition explain the di®erences?
In this section, I ¯rst examine whether di®erences in sectoral composition explain the
di®erence in the average size of all establishments, the average size of opening and
closing establishments, and the entry and exit rates in the U.S. and Japan. (I do not
have su±cient information to examine the \JC/JD fact.")
Table 5 is the share in terms of the number of establishments, calculated from
the SUSB dataset and the EEC dataset used in the previous section. Table 6 shows
the employment share. There are, indeed, some di®erences in sectoral composition
between the U.S. and Japan. For example, \Manufacturing" and \Wholesale and
Retail Trade" are signi¯cantly larger (both in terms of the number of establishments
and the employment share) in Japan, while \Finance and Insurance" and \Health Care
and Social Assistance" are signi¯cantly larger in the U.S. Below, I use the sector-level
information, including Table 5, to explore the e®ect of sectoral composition.
7U.S. Japan






Transportation and Warehousingg 2.8 2.2
Wholesale and Retail Tradeh 22.0 27.3
Finance and Insurancei 6.6 1.4
Real Estate and Rental and Leasingj 4.4 5.5
Accommodation and Food Servicesk 7.9 13.4
Health Care and Social Assistancel 10.3 6.0
Education Servicesm 1.5 3.9
Other Servicesn 27.7 19.9
a For Japan, this is categories from A to C in the EEC table.
b For Japan, this is category D.
c For Japan, this is category E.
d For Japan, this is category F.
e For Japan, this is category G.
f For Japan, this is category H.
g For Japan, this is category I.
h For Japan, this is category J. For the U.S., this is \Wholesale Trade" and \Retail
Trade" combined.
i For Japan, this is category K.
j For Japan, this is category L.
k For Japan, this is category M.
l For Japan, this is category N.
m For Japan, this is category O.
n For Japan, this is categories P and Q. For the U.S., this the sum of \Pro-
fessional, Scienti¯c, and Technical Services," \Management of Companies and
Enterprises," \Administrative and Support and Waste Management and Re-
mediation Services," \Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation," \Other Services
(except Public Administration)," and \Unclassi¯ed." The size of \Unclassi¯ed"
is very small (less than 0.3% of the total).
Table 5: The share in the number of all establishments (%)
8U.S. Japan






Transportation and Warehousing 3.6 5.1
Wholesale and Retail Trade 18.3 21.8
Finance and Insurance 5.7 2.5
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 1.8 1.8
Accommodation and Food Services 9.2 8.6
Health Care and Social Assistance 13.6 9.8
Education Services 2.4 5.2
Other Services 22.9 16.5
Table 6: The employment share in each sector (%)
3.1 Average size
Let ¹ ni be total employment in sector i and ¹ n be total employment in the whole econ-
omy. Let ¹ Ni be the total number of establishments in sector i, and ¹ N be the total
number of establishments in the whole economy. The economy-wide average size of



















where ASi ´ ¹ ni= ¹ Ni is the average size of an establishment in sector i and SHi ´ ¹ Ni= ¹ N
is the share of sector i in terms of the number of establishments. I can measure the
pure e®ect of sectoral composition by calculating AS using the U.S. values of ASi
and Japanese values of SHi. If the main reason that the U.S. has a larger average
establishment size is because the sectors with larger establishments have higher shares,
imposing the Japanese SHi would bring the value of AS down close to the Japanese
size (9.4). However, this exercise results in the value of 19:3, which is even larger than
the U.S. value in the data (17.6). Indeed, Japan has a larger manufacturing share than
9U.S. Japan






Transportation and Warehousing 22.8 22.3
Wholesale and Retail Trade 14.6 7.7
Finance and Insurance 15.2 17.0
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 7.1 3.2
Accommodation and Food Services 20.5 6.2
Health Care and Social Assistance 23.4 15.9
Education Services 41.1 12.7
Other Services 14.5 8.0
Table 7: Average size in each sector
the U.S., and the manufacturing plants are on average larger than the establishments
in other sectors.
This experiment shows that the smallness of the average Japanese establishment is
not due to the sectoral composition. In fact, if I look at ASi in Table 7 individually,
ASi is smaller for Japanese establishments in most of the sectors.
3.2 Average size of opening and closing establishments


























i = ¹ Ni










where the superscript e denotes entering establishments. REi = ERi=ER measures
the entry rate in sector i, ERi ´ ¹ Ne
i = ¹ Ni, relative to the total entry rate ER ´ Ne= ¹ N.
This captures the fact that some sectors have higher entry rate than other sectors. To
measure the sectoral composition e®ect, I can calculate the ASe with the U.S. values
10of ASe
i and REi,13 and the Japanese values of SHi. If the sectoral composition has an
e®ect, this exercise will a®ect the value of ASe. However, this results in the value of 8:6,
which is similar to the original U.S. value (8.3). The same counterpart can be calculated
for the closing establishments, and this results in the value of 9:1, again similar to the
original U.S. value (9.0). Here I ¯nd that the di®erences in sectoral composition have
almost no e®ect on the average sizes of opening and closing establishments.
3.3 Entry and exit rates





















With this formula, I can evaluate the pure sectoral composition e®ect by using ERi
in the U.S. and SHi in Japan. If the sectoral composition is the main cause of the
U.S.-Japan di®erence, then this exercise should result in a similar entry rate as the
Japanese rate (4.4%). However, this gives 11:3%, which is very similar to the original
U.S. value (11.6%). I can conduct the same experiment for the exit rate, and I obtain
10:1%. Again, this is closer to the original U.S. value (10.2%) than the Japanese value
(4.4%). Thus, the sectoral composition has little e®ect on the entry and exit rates.
In all three experiments above, I obtained values that are very similar to the original
U.S. value after adjusting the sectoral composition to the Japanese values. Therefore,
I conclude that the di®erences between the U.S. and Japan in these dimensions are not
due to the di®erences in sectoral composition. Rather, the behavior of each establish-
ment is di®erent across these countries in determining the average size of establishments
and the entry/exit rates. Below, I use the original unadjusted values when I evaluate
the model.
13These can be calculated from the SUSB dataset.
114 Model
In this section, I set up a dynamic general equilibrium model of entry and exit. The
strategy here is to calibrate the model to the U.S. data and examine what kind of
\frictions" can be responsible for the properties of Japanese data.
The model is based on Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993). I modify the exit process
to match the model to the data. In particular, I make two modi¯cations. First, there
are endogenous and exogenous exits (in Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), there is only
endogenous exit). Second, I add positive exit values, as in Lee and Mukoyama (2008).14
4.1 Establishments
Time is discrete. There are two kinds of entities in the economy: establishments and
consumers. The establishments produce the consumption goods for consumers. Con-
sumers supply labor (the only production factor) to the establishments. The consumers
also own the establishments and receive pro¯ts.
Here I describe the behavior of the establishments. First, I describe the timing of
incumbent establishments. Then I describe the entrants' timing.
An incumbent establishment starts period t with the individual state (st¡1;nt¡1).
st¡1 is the productivity level of the establishment in period t¡1. nt¡1 is its employment
level in period t ¡ 1. The value function of an establishment at this stage is denoted
as W(st¡1;nt¡1). Then, it receives an \exogenous exit" shock, Ãt 2 f0;1g. If Ãt = 1,
it has to exit (without receiving any value). If Ãt = 0, it has a choice of whether to
stay or to exit after seeing the exit value. Ãt follows an i.i.d. stochastic process and Ãt
is 1 with probability ± and Ãt is 0 with probability (1 ¡ ±). Then the establishment
14The exit values can be interpreted as the value of the used capital or the value of the land sold
upon exit. In the model, the cost of obtaining new capital or land upon entry is considered to be
included in the entry cost. As is argued in Lee and Mukoyama (2008), the stochastic exit value is
necessary in order to account for the exit rate and the average size of the exiting establishments at
the same time. If the exit value is the same across establishments, either the exit rate in the model
becomes too large or the average size of the exiting establishments in the model becomes too small
compared to the data. An alternative assumption is to introduce a stochastic ¯xed cost for operation,
as in Moscoso Boedo and Mukoyama (2008) and Samaniego (2008).
12observes the exit value. The exit value xt 2 f0; ¹ xg also follows an i.i.d. process and
xt = ¹ x with probability » and xt = 0 with probability (1¡»). I assume that adjusting
employment costs °jnt ¡ nt¡1j amount of adjustment cost (where ° ¸ 0)|thus an
exiting establishment has to pay °nt¡1 for adjusting the employment down to zero. If
it decides to stay, it observes the current period's productivity st. The distribution of
st given st¡1 is expressed by the conditional distribution ´(stjst¡1). The value function
at this point is denoted as V (st;nt¡1). Then it decides the amount of employment in
the current period, nt, and produces. The production function is f(nt;st), which is
increasing and concave in nt. If nt 6= nt¡1, it pays adjustment costs °jnt¡nt¡1j. I also
assume that there is a size tax: if nt ¸ ^ n, it has to pay ·(nt ¡ ^ n) where · ¸ 0. The
size tax is rebated to the consumer in a lump-sum manner.
The entrant draws the initial productivity st from the distribution º(st). Then it
decides the employment nt and produces. It has to incur the adjustment cost|since
it increases employment from zero, it has to pay °nt. It is also subject to the size tax.
The incumbent solves the Bellman equation
















0 ¡ nj ¡ ·maxh0;n
0 ¡ ^ ni + ¯W(s
0;n
0)g:
Here, Ex[¢] denotes the expectation with respect to x, and ¯ is the discount factor. Let
the decision rule of n0 be n0 = Á(s0;n). Also de¯ne the decision rule for endogenous
exiting when x = ¹ x realizes as Â(s;n): Â(s;n) = 1 when the establishment exits and
Â(s;n) = 0 when the establishment stays. In the following, I will assume a production
function under which there is no endogenous exiting when x = 0 realizes.







I assume free entry, therefore
V
e = ce (3)
holds in an equilibrium with positive entry.
134.2 Consumers









where Ct is consumption and Lt is the labor supply. A is a constant parameter. The
budget constraint is
Ct = wtLt + ¦t + Rt; (4)
where ¦t is the total pro¯t (including the exit value) and Rt is the rebate of the size





From here, I will focus on the stationary equilibrium where all of the aggregate variables
are constant. The total pro¯t is given by
¦t = Yt ¡ wtLt ¡ Ht ¡ Rt ¡ Ntce + Xt; (6)




where ¹(st;nt¡1) is the (stationary) distribution of establishments that are going to









t is the adjustment cost paid by the establishments which produce in period t,
and Hx

















The ¯rst term is the adjustment cost for exogenous exit and the second term is the
adjustment cost for endogenous exit. Nt is the total amount of entrants. The total
exit value can be calculated by
Xt = Xt+1 = ¹ x(1 ¡ ±)»
Z
Â(st;Á(st;nt¡1))d¹(st;nt¡1):
From (4) and (6),
Ct = Yt ¡ Ht ¡ Ntce + Xt:
Combining this with (5),
wt
Yt ¡ Ht ¡ Ntce + Xt
= A (7)




Since the establishment decision rules are only a®ected by wt, I can solve the
Bellman equations and obtain the equilibrium wt from (3). Given the decision rules
obtained from the optimization, I can calculate ¹(st;nt¡1) for any given amount of
entry. Let ¹1(st;nt¡1) be the stationary distribution when the number of entrants is
assumed to be one. Then, ¹(st;nt¡1) = Nt¹1(st;nt¡1) holds. Therefore, given the
decision rules and wt, (7) pins down the equilibrium value of Nt.
4.4 Calibration and benchmark results
The strategy here is to match the model moments with no adjustment costs (° = 0)
and no tax (· = 0) to the U.S. data and use the matched model as the benchmark.
Then I will ask what kind of parameter changes would help explain the di®erences
between the U.S. and Japan.





1 ¡ 4 72.04 72.04
5 ¡ 9 14.03 14.03
10 ¡ 19 7.32 7.32
20 ¡ 49 4.27 4.27
50 ¡ 99 1.37 1.37
100 ¡ 499 0.88 0.88
500 ¡ 999 0.06 0.06
1000¡ 0.04 0.03
Table 8: Size distribution of entrants (%), U.S. data and model
As in the standard real business cycles literature, I set ¯ = 0:94 and µ = 0:64. Following
Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), I set the benchmark value of w = 1. This is achieved
by setting ce so that the free-entry condition (3) holds under w = 1. I set the value of
A so that the benchmark value of L becomes 0:6. This is done by ¯rst ¯nding an N
that satis¯es (8) with L = 0:6, and then setting A so that (7) holds with this N.
For the stochastic processes, I use the following method. First, I discretize the
domain of st. In particular, I pick eight grids of st so that the optimal amount of
employment without adjustment cost at each st corresponds to the midpoint of the
cells in Table 1.15 (For the largest cell, I pick nt = 1001.) Then I try to match the
model outcome to the cross-section property of the data. The entrant's distribution
º(s) is set so that the size distribution of the entrants match the data, as in Table 8.
The stochastic exit probability ± is set at 0:044. This value is somewhat arbitrary|
the number is set so that if all exiting is exogenous, the exit rate matches the Japanese
value. To match the distribution of exit rates, I could instead consider a more elaborate
distribution for the exit values xt (as in Lee and Mukoyama 2008). Here, in e®ect, I
am making all of the exits by large establishments exogenous (and all of the exit by
Japanese establishments exogenous in the later experiments). The advantage of this
approach is that the exit value (at both micro and macro levels) does not have to be
15In contrast, I make sure that I have enough grids on n, so that the optimal choice is not constrained
by the discreteness of the grid.
16Data Model
1 ¡ 4 14.88 18.74
5 ¡ 9 6.72 4.40
10 ¡ 19 5.57 4.40
20 ¡ 49 4.91 4.40
50 ¡ 99 4.58 4.40
100 ¡ 499 4.10 4.40
500 ¡ 999 4.25 4.40
1000¡ 4.21 4.40
Table 9: Exit rates (%), U.S. data and model
unrealistically high. The disadvantage is that I cannot analyze the policy responses of
large establishments' exits.
The exit value ¹ x is set at ¹ x = 35, which is just above the value of the establishment
with the lowest s. This choice is motivated by the pattern of exit rates shown in Table
9. There, the exit rate of the smallest size cell is markedly di®erent from the other
cells. The probability of receiving a positive exit value, », is set so that the average
size of the closing establishments is similar to the data. Since ¹ x is just above the value
of the smallest establishments that stay, any parameter changes that make the value
of staying higher would make them stay. This will happen, for example, when I raise
the entry cost (higher entry cost reduces the wage, and through lower costs raises the
value of operating).
For the transition probabilities of st, I ¯rst assume that it follows an AR(1) process:
log(st+1) = a + ½log(st) + ²t+1;
where ²t+1 » N(0;¾2). Then, I approximate this on the s grids, in a similar manner
as Tauchen (1986). I set ½ = 0:98. This value is motivated from the highly persis-
tent employment process in the U.S. manufacturing sector, as documented in Lee and
Mukoyama (2008). The value of ¾ is set so that the total job creation rate becomes
similar to the data. a is set at ¡0:004 and this brings the average size of all establish-
ments close to the data. Table 10 summarizes the statistics from the U.S. data and
17Data Model
Average size of all establishments 17.6 17.8
Average size of opening establishments 8.3 10.0
Average size of closing establishments 9.0 8.8
Entry rate (%) 11.6 10.9
Exit rate (%) 10.2 10.9
Total JC rate (%) 15.8 15.4
JC rate by opening establishments (%) 5.5 6.1
Total JD rate (%) 14.4 15.4
JD rate by closing establishments (%) 5.2 5.3
Table 10: Summary statistics
Data Model
1 ¡ 4 48.52 45.02
5 ¡ 9 21.52 26.34
10 ¡ 19 14.24 15.53
20 ¡ 49 9.77 7.95
50 ¡ 99 3.32 3.52
100 ¡ 499 2.35 1.24
500 ¡ 999 0.17 0.27
1000¡ 0.10 0.11
Table 11: The size distribution of establishments in U.S. data and model (%)
the model. Table 11 depicts the size distribution of establishments in the U.S. data
and the model. Given that the calibration target is only the average value, this shows
a very good match.
4.5 Experiments
Here, I run four experiments using the model. I add di®erent \frictions" to the bench-
mark model in each case. In all four cases, I do not have appropriate data to pin
down the policy parameter values. Therefore, these experiments should be seen as
suggestive|showing theoretical possibilities|that these frictions may contribute to
18Data Model
Average size of all establishments 9.4 12.4
Average size of opening establishments 9.6 10.3
Average size of closing establishments 7.9 12.4
Entry rate (%) 4.4 4.4
Exit rate (%) 4.4 4.4
Total JC rate (%) 8.7 13.9
JC rate by opening establishments (%) 4.5 3.7
Total JD rate (%) 7.6 13.9
JD rate by closing establishments (%) 3.7 4.4
Table 12: Summary statistics for Experiment 1: Japanese data and model
the di®erences in the establishment behavior between the U.S. and Japan.
4.5.1 Experiment 1: no exit value
First, I consider the change in the exit value. The exit value directly a®ects the exit
decision. Regulations regarding exiting,16 underdeveloped used capital market, and
illiquid real estate market would reduce the value of exiting. An additional (somewhat
more likely) possibility is that the in°uences of \speci¯c capital" and \organizational
capital" are stronger in Japan than in the U.S. The values of these types of capital
disappear when the establishment exits, and therefore the existence of these types of
capital reduces the exit value.
Here, I run an experiment with ¹ x = 0. This is, in e®ect, assuming that there
is no endogenous exit.17 Therefore, I can match the entry and exit rate of 4:4% by
construction, which is similar to the Japanese value.
Table 12 summarizes the result. The \Data" column in the experiments is the
Japanese data. Somewhat surprisingly, the average size of all establishments falls
16This could include the structure of legal systems surrounding the bankruptcy and liquidation.
17If, alternatively, a continuous distribution for the exit value is assumed (as in Lee and Mukoyama
(2008)) instead of the current two-point distribution, it would be possible to ¯nd a parametrization
where some endogenous exit survives. The current formulation should be regarded as a shortcut so
that the outcome of the low exit value can easily be evaluated.
19Data Model
Average size of all establishments 9.4 16.3
Average size of opening establishments 9.6 13.6
Average size of closing establishments 7.9 16.3
Entry rate (%) 4.4 4.4
Exit rate (%) 4.4 4.4
Total JC rate (%) 8.7 13.9
JC rate by opening establishments (%) 4.5 3.7
Total JD rate (%) 7.6 13.9
JD rate by closing establishments (%) 3.7 4.4
Table 13: Summary statistics for Experiment 2: Japanese data and model
substantially and becomes close to the Japanese data. The reason is that small estab-
lishments exit less frequently|therefore, many small establishments remain operating.
Therefore, here I match the \size fact" on the establishments by forcing the match of
the \entry/exit fact." This experiment fails to match the \JC/JD fact" since the JC
rate by existing establishments (which is the total JC rate minus the JC rate by opening
establishments) remains high.
4.5.2 Experiment 2: higher entry cost
Another possibility in generating a lower entry/exit rate in Japan is that a Japanese
establishment may be facing a larger entry cost. In practice, it is di±cult to measure
all of the aspects of the entry cost. However, there are some indications that the
entry cost is somewhat higher in Japan due to regulations. For example, the \Doing
Business" dataset18 (constructed by the World Bank) shows that in 2006 the monetary
cost of starting a business was 7.5% of income per capita in Japan, while it was 0.7%
of income per capita in the U.S. While both numbers are very small,19 other measures
also consistently show that it is more costly to start up a business in Japan.
Here, for illustration, I let ce be 20% higher than the benchmark. Table 13 shows
18See http://www.doingbusiness.org.
19In particular, compared to countries like Sierra Leone (1194.5%) and Angola (486.7%). See
Moscoso Boedo and Mukoyama (2008) for analysis of these extreme cases.
20Data Model
Average size of all establishments 9.4 13.1
Average size of opening establishments 9.6 9.2
Average size of closing establishments 7.9 13.1
Entry rate (%) 4.4 4.4
Exit rate (%) 4.4 4.4
Total JC rate (%) 8.7 8.4
JC rate by opening establishments (%) 4.5 3.1
Total JD rate (%) 7.6 8.4
JD rate by closing establishments (%) 3.7 4.4
Table 14: Summary statistics for Experiment 3: Japanese data and model
the outcome. The results are similar to Experiment 1. The entry/exit rates fall
and the average size of the all establishments also falls. The decline in the average
size is somewhat smaller, since the decline in wages encourages the establishments to
expand. The JC/JD rates by the existing establishments remain high. In other words,
it is di±cult to di®erentiate a low exit value against a high entry cost in this model.
Here, the experiments suggest that either (or both) may have important e®ects on
accounting for the \entry/exit fact" and the \size fact." They also suggest that these
factors are not su±cient to explain the \JC/JD fact." Below, I investigate additional
institutional di®erences that may explain the \JC/JD fact," while maintaining the low
exit value (the results would be similar if I instead assume a high entry cost).
4.5.3 Experiment 3: labor adjustment cost (with no exit value)
Here I investigate the possibility that Japanese establishments face a higher labor
adjustment cost. It is often suggested that the labor market in Japan is more \rigid"
than the U.S. labor market, in the sense that it is more costly to reallocate labor across
di®erent production units. For example, OECD (2004, Chart 2.1) shows that Japan
has stronger employment protection regulations overall compared to U.S., in particular
in the forms of \regulation on temporary forms of employment" and \protection of
permanent workers against (individual) dismissal."
21Data Model
Average size of all establishments 9.4 9.5
Average size of opening establishments 9.6 8.5
Average size of closing establishments 7.9 9.5
Entry rate (%) 4.4 4.4
Exit rate (%) 4.4 4.4
Total JC rate (%) 8.7 8.7
JC rate by opening establishments (%) 4.5 4.0
Total JD rate (%) 7.6 8.7
JD rate by closing establishments (%) 3.7 4.4
Table 15: Summary statistics for Experiment 4: Japanese data and model
Here, I let ° = 0:4, while maintaining the assumption in Experiment 1 (¹ x = 0).
Table 14 summarizes the result. Now the \JC/JD fact" is also matched. All of the
model statistics are in line with the data, except that the average size is still somewhat
higher in the model.
4.5.4 Experiment 4: size tax (with no exit value)
Finally, I consider a tax on size.20 In particular, I tax an establishment which is
larger than ^ n, with the amount that is proportional to the number of the workers in
excess to ^ n.21 A well-known example of this type of regulation in Japan is the \Large
Scale Retail Store Law" (replaced in 2000 by the \Large Scale Retail Location Law")
introduced in 1974. It restricts the entry of a large-scale retail store by requiring it
to go through special procedures. Not surprisingly, in Table 7, \Wholesale and Retail
Trade" establishments are much smaller in Japan than in the U.S. This \size tax" can
also be a re°ection of the extra cost of operating on a large scale, such as the cost of
constructing a large factory or the cost of obtaining a large piece of land.
Here, I assume that · = 0:4 and ^ n = 10, in addition to the assumptions from
Experiment 1 (¹ x = 0). That is, there is an annual size tax that is 40% of the benchmark
20Guner, Ventura, and Yi (2008) analyze this type of policy in a broader context.
21Although here I consider a positive tax, if taxed negatively this type of tax can also re°ect policies
that favor large establishments or credit market conditions that favor large projects.
22w C L Y=L Y=Lµ
Baseline 1.00 0.72 0.60 1.56 1.30
Experiment 1 0.98 0.70 0.54 1.54 1.23
Experiment 2 0.89 0.64 0.54 1.39 1.11
Experiment 3 0.88 0.63 0.52 1.49 1.18
Experiment 4 0.76 0.54 0.41 1.61 1.17
Table 16: Wage, consumption, employment, and productivity
annual wage for each worker in excess of 10 workers. Table 15 shows the result. All of
the statistics are in line with the data. One aspect that is superior to Experiment 3 is
that the average size also decreases to the level of what the data shows.
In sum, combinations of
1. low exit value and/or high entry cost, and
2. labor adjustment cost and/or size regulations
bring the model close to the Japanese data. Whether the values of the policy param-
eters that I set are reasonable or not remains to be studied in the future.
4.5.5 Wages, consumption, employment, and productivity
In Table 16 I show the values of wages, consumption, employment, and productivity
in each experiments. It can be seen that each policy generates substantial changes in
the aggregate variables. One puzzling observation is that in these experiments, L is
much lower in Japan than in the U.S. (baseline). This is particularly puzzling since the
working hours in Japan are typically considered to be higher than in the U.S.22 This
may be due to the elements that the model is missing. For example, Prescott (2004)
argues that a large part of the di®erence in the U.S.-Europe (and the U.S.-Japan) labor
supply can be explained by the di®erence in the tax system.
The low wage re°ects a low labor productivity. I present two measures of pro-
ductivity, Y=L and Y=Lµ. Both indicate, in general, that productivity is lowered by
22See, for example, Prescott (2004, Table 1).
23the frictions. The only exception is a high Y=L in Experiment 4, which is due to a
very low level of production (the level of L is very small) and decreasing returns to
scale.23 The value of Y=Lµ (conceptually closer to total factor productivity) indicates
that productivity is indeed lower in this case as well.
Because of the low level of exits (due to low exit value or low entry pressure),
many low-productivity establishments continue to survive. This somewhat resembles
the \zombie ¯rms" hypothesis by Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2008). One im-
portant di®erence is that here the lower number of exits does not have to be due to
the malfunction of the banking sector, which is emphasized by Caballero, Hoshi, and
Kashyap (2008). In particular, the frictions in the entry margin can also generate the
low exit rate through general equilibrium e®ects. In relation to the banking sector,
it is also possible that insu±cient funding of the entering production units allows in-
e±cient establishments to survive.24 In addition, the labor adjustment cost inhibits
the reallocation of labor from low-productivity establishments to high-productivity es-
tablishments. When there is a size tax, it suppresses the growth of high-productivity
establishments.
Past studies using ¯rm-level data seem to have a similar message. For example,
Fukao and Kwon (2006) analyze Japanese ¯rm-level data in the manufacturing sector
from 1994-2001 using a method similar to Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001).
They conclude that the productivity gain from reallocation was very small in the
Japanese manufacturing sector during that period.25
23Recall that the wage is determined by the free-entry condition (3). The wage level re°ects the
pro¯tability of the establishment. (The wage is high if the establishment is pro¯table for a given wage.)
Here, the pro¯tability is low because of the low exit value and the size tax. Note that the wage is not
necessarily equal to the marginal product of labor (which is proportional to the output-labor ratio in
each establishment) given the size tax.
24Hosono (2008) applies the model of Gomes (2001) to the Japanese economy and emphasizes the
role of external ¯nance cost. As is discussed in Lee and Mukoyama (2008), it is possible that the
¯nancial cost is an important part of the entry cost. A subtle issue is that the current model is about
an \establishment" as a production unit, while one should construct a model of a \¯rm" as a ¯nancial
unit when the ¯nancial cost is explicitly analyzed.
25The current paper focuses on the size, rather than the productivity of establishments. However,
in the current model, the size re°ects the productivity, and there is a strongly positive relationship
between them. Recent empirical papers using ¯rm-level datasets in Japan, such as Ahn, Fukao, and
245 Conclusion
In this paper, I explored the di®erences between the U.S. and Japan in establishment-
level dynamics. I found that there are three substantial di®erences. First, entry and
exit rates are much lower in Japan. Second, the average size of establishments is much
smaller in Japan, while the average size of opening/closing establishments are similar
in the U.S. and Japan. Third, the amount of job creation and job destruction is much
smaller in Japan, especially for continuing establishments.
I investigated whether these di®erences can be explained by di®erences in sectoral
composition. I found that the di®erences in sectoral composition do not explain the
aforementioned facts. Then I built a general equilibrium industry dynamics model to
analyze what type of frictions can account for these facts.
I ran four experiments using the model. First two experiments suggest that there
may be important impediments for establishment entry/exit in Japan. It also suggests
that the lack of the selection at the exit margin explains some part of the smaller
establishment size in Japan. The third and fourth experiments indicate that there
may be factors impeding productive establishments from growing larger. Searching for
these impediments in reality is the important next step ahead. Some of them would
re°ect government regulations, but they may also re°ect malfunctions of the credit
market. Once these impediments are identi¯ed, it will be possible to prescribe policies
that enhance reallocation of resources for more productive use.
In this paper, I have stayed away from discussing the detailed issues of international
data comparison, by using the o±cial data at face value. As Bartelsman, Haltiwanger,
and Scarpetta (2007) discuss, there are many delicate issues regarding the comparison
Kwon (2004), Nishimura, Nakajima, and Kiyota (2005), and Fukao and Kwon (2006), ¯nd cases where
the average productivity of exiting ¯rms are higher than the average productivity of surviving ¯rms.
If interpreted as a model of \¯rms," it is di±cult for the current model to replicate this empirical
result, unless the exit value of a ¯rm is negative. Further investigation of this ¯rm-level phenomenon
is beyond the scope of this paper. This phenomenon may be due to the malfunction of the ¯nancial
sector as the literature above suggests. My conjecture is that the strong aversion of Japanese ¯rms
to ¯le bankruptcy, in addition to the lack of competition (due to the di±culty of entry) and the poor
¯nancial sector (which also contributes the di±culty of entry) including the \zombie lending," plays
an important role in explaining the ¯rm-level entry/exit facts.
25of micro-level data across countries. Although the statistics used in this paper are
relatively clear-cut and straightforward, it is generally di±cult to avoid subtle incon-
sistencies in the way in which data is collected and the way in which the variables are
de¯ned. A more rigorous comparison of the data is also a promising future research
topic.
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